Bernard E. Rollin on the Moral Status of Animals
NOVEMBER 25, 2016
Philosophers have shown that the standard reasons offered to exclude animals from the moral circle, and to justify not assessing our treatment of them by the same moral categories and machinery we use for assessing the treatment of humans, do not meet the test of moral relevance. Rollin , "The Moral Status of Animals and Their Use as Experimental Subjects," chap.
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 13 of 13
DECEMBER 6, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. CONCLUSION There is no doubt that moral vegetarianism will continue to be a position that attracts people concerned with the plight of animals and with humanitarian goals. Although I have found no compelling moral arguments for vegetarianism, there still may be reasons why morally sensitive people would wish to become vegetarians. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 12 of 13
NOVEMBER 9, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. People who do not eat meat for moral reasons tend to be less brutal than people who do eat meat. People who eat meat after reflection on the morality of eating meat are less brutal than people who eat meat without such reflection. The bulk of the population has given no reflection at all to the morality of eating meat. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 1 of 13
JANUARY 9, 2009
A third of a century ago, when the modern animal-liberation movement was in its infancy, Martin published an essay entitled “A Critique of Moral Vegetarianism,” Reason Papers (fall 1976): 13-43. This was two years after Robert Nozick discussed the moral status of nonhuman animals in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) and one year after Peter Singer published Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975). Another reason is moral.
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 10 of 13
AUGUST 21, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. The implication is certainly that it would be inconsistent for us to think that it is morally permissible for us to eat nonhuman animals but wrong for superior aliens to eat us. But it is not clear that it is inconsistent if there is a relevant moral difference between animals and humans not found between humans and superior aliens. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 6 of 13
APRIL 16, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. One might assume—although again this assumption may not be jusitified [sic]—that Mr. Morse was using this consideration as a moral argument for vegetarianism. But what exactly does the argument construed as a moral argument amount to? Even granted the premises, the moral conclusion does not follow from the factual premises. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 2 of 13
JANUARY 21, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. SOME PROBLEMS OF MORAL VEGETARIANISM With respect to traditional moral vegetarianism some problems immediately come to the fore. What animals is it morally wrong to eat? If animals could be created by genetic engineering, could they be created so that there were no moral objections to eating them? But what is the extent of the universal moral principle?
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 5 of 13
MARCH 27, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. ARGUMENTS FOR MORAL VEGETARIANISM A variety of arguments have been given for vegetarianism. Sometimes they take such a sketchy form that it is not completely clear they are moral arguments. I outline two arguments of this sort in what follows in order to illustrate some of the difficulties in evaluating moral vegetarianism. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 9 of 13
JULY 7, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. Consequently, the killing of some animals for food, if done painlessly, is not morally objectionable. But far from supporting moral vegetarianism, these alternative analyses seem to make moral vegetarianism even more difficult to support in terms of animal rights. According to Benn, only moral agents have rights. Only moral agents have autonomy rights.
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 4 of 13
MARCH 8, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. For example, if one could pick up shed animal legs in a pasture in which animals roam freely among their own kind, there might be no moral objection to eating the legs. If, on the other hand, the legs are produced in factory conditions, there is a moral objection. They suggest that any simple moral vegetarianism is impossible. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
JANUARY 12, 2007
If you'd like to read Andrew Tardiff's 1996 essay "Simplifying the Case for Vegetarianism," write to me (by clicking "Contact" in the sidebar) and I'll send a copy. The essay is fabulous
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 3 of 13
FEBRUARY 15, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. Most moral vegetarians list fish and fowl as animals one should not eat. The ability to feel pain is not an obviously plausible way of morally distinguishing microorganisms from other organisms. What is the moral difference between killing a microorganism in the digesting of other food and killing a hog, e.g., in order to eat and digest it. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 11 of 13
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. The Argument from Human Grain Shortage All of the clearly moral arguments for vegetarianism given so far have been in terms of animal rights and suffering. New moral vegetarianism, however, rests on moral arguments couched in terms of human welfare. This argument also differs from traditional ones in its selective and restrictive moral prohibitions against eating flesh.
Moral Vegetarianism, Part 8 of 13
JUNE 4, 2009
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. It can be argued instead that by eating meat one is giving one’s tacit consent or approval to the present situation, that the only way to be true to one’s moral conviction that the present treatment of animals is inhumane is not to eat meat. The question arises: Why should such indirect causal influence have any moral import? Tags: Moral Vegetarianism
Jonathan Bennett on Revisable Morality
DECEMBER 31, 2008
There is a difficulty about drawing from all this a moral for ourselves. But then we can say this because we can say that all those are bad moralities, whereas we cannot look at our own moralities and declare them bad. This is not arrogance: it is obviously incoherent for someone to declare the system of moral principles that he accepts to be bad, just as one cannot coherently say of anything that one believes it but it is false.
J. J. C. Smart on the Moral Elite
DECEMBER 28, 2010
Let us think of the more moral members of society as a moral elite, much as the generality of scientists form a scientific elite. I hope I do not need to stress that such a moral elite must not be confused with a social or intellectual elite.
Henry S. Salt (1851-1939) on Moral Blindness
OCTOBER 31, 2009
Jan Narveson on Moral Vegetarianism
JUNE 17, 2008
It would remain true, of course, that the vegetarian diet is more limited, since every pleasure available to the vegetarian is also available to the carnivore (not counting the moral satisfactions involved, of course—which would be question-begging), plus more which are not available to the vegetarian so long as he remains one.
Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Received Morality
NOVEMBER 17, 2008
Again, all or most men in whom the moral consciousness is strongly developed find themselves from time to time in conflict with the commonly received morality of the society to which they belong: and thus—as was before said—have a crucial experience proving that duty does not mean to them what other men will disapprove of them for not doing.
Henry S. Salt (1851-1939) on Beefy Morals
APRIL 10, 2009
A nice moral bond of union, truly, between colonies and motherland! We come back, then, to the point that though it is not absolutely true that "Man is what he eats," there is, nevertheless, a large element of truth in the saying, and the Vegetarian has just ground for suspecting that beefy meals are not infrequently the precursors of beefy morals.
W. D. Ross (1877-1971) on the Moral Significance of Pleasure and Pain
AUGUST 30, 2011
But when a moral being is feeling a pleasure or pain that is deserved or undeserved, or a pleasure or pain that implies a good or a bad disposition, the total fact is quite inadequately described if we say 'a sentient being is feeling pleasure, or pain'.
J. J. C. Smart on the Moral Status of Animals
AUGUST 19, 2009
I assumed that Hume was right in thinking that ultimately morality depends on how we feel about things. Smart , "Utilitarianism and Generalized Benevolence," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 [January-April 1980]: 115-21, at 115 [italics in original; endnote omitted]) Note from KBJ: Smart is mistaken if he thinks that only utilitarianism accords moral status to animals.
John Passmore (1914-2004) on the Moral Status of Animals
MAY 25, 2008
One restriction on the absolutism of man's rule over Nature is now generally accepted: moral philosophers and public opinion agree that it is morally impermissible to be cruel to animals. And by this they mean not only that it is wrong to enjoy torturing animals—which few moralists would ever have wished explicitly to deny, however little emphasis they might have placed on cruelty to animals in their moral teaching—but that it is wrong to cause them to suffer unnecessarily.
Peter Singer on the Moral Significance of Self-Consciousness
JULY 17, 2008
Self-consciousness is morally significant; species, like race or sex, is not Preference utilitarians count the killing of a being with a preference for continued life as worse than the killing of a being without any such preference. Self-conscious beings therefore are not mere receptacles for containing a certain quantity of pleasure, and are not replaceable. To take the view that non-self-conscious beings are replaceable is not to say that their interests do not count.
Tom Regan on Endangered Species
AUGUST 15, 2012
If people are encouraged to believe that the harm done to animals matters morally only when these animals belong to endangered species, then these same people will be encouraged to regard the harm done to other animals as morally acceptable.
NOVEMBER 28, 2012
and anyone else who is interested in the moral status of nonhuman animals I began this blog nine years ago today. Here is the first post.) In that time, there have been 245,434 visits, which is an average of 27,270.4 visits per year and 74.6 visits per day. My posting has slowed considerably, but I hope the archive is of use to students (no plagiarism, please!)
Tom Regan on Utilitarianism
JULY 24, 2012
The initial attractiveness of utilitarianism as a moral theory on which to rest the call for the better treatment of animals was noted in an earlier context.
Henry S. Salt (1851-1939) on the Golden Rule
DECEMBER 11, 2013
How, then, shall we sum up in a sentence the principle of our duties to the lower animals?
FEBRUARY 26, 2012
Morally serious people ignore them PETA is the worst thing ever to happen to animals.
APRIL 26, 2008
Prince Fielder of the Milwaukee Brewers is a moral vegetarian
H. J. McCloskey on Animal Rights
DECEMBER 1, 2010
If an animal has the relevant moral capacities, actually or potentially, then it can be a possessor of rights. It may for this reason be morally appropriate for us meanwhile to act towards the former animals as if they are possessors of rights. (H.
Hal Herzog's "Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat"
AUGUST 16, 2011
He is an unabashed speciesist, putting humans on “a different moral plane from that of other animals” (11) due to various reasons, such as our “vastly greater capacity for symbolic language, culture, and ethical judgment” (11). The campaign to moralize meat has largely been a failure.
Tom Regan on the Animal-Rights Movement
SEPTEMBER 14, 2012
Moral philosophy is no substitute for political action. In issuing its condemnation of established cultural practices, the rights view is not antibusiness, not antifreedom of the individual, not antiscience, not antihuman.
AUGUST 28, 2009
Some people abstain from meat for religious rather than moral reasons. See here
Americans Still Support Wearing Fur and Animal Testing
MAY 22, 2009
Disappointing results from Gallup's annual "moral acceptability" measure. The article also shows results on non-animal issues as well. Not surprisingly, Republicans tend to take more conservative stances than Democrats.
JULY 9, 2012
It's not clear whether he's doing it for moral reasons, for health reasons, or both A professional football player has gone vegan.
W. D. Ross (1877-1971) on the Right and the Good
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011
Now when we ask what is the general nature of morally good actions, it seems quite clear that it is in virtue of the motives that they proceed from that actions are morally good. The drawing of a rigid distinction between the right and the morally good frees us from such confusion. (W.
MARCH 11, 2007
Is this sort of hunting any worse, morally, than the traditional sort See here.
Tom Regan on Kant's View of Animals
JUNE 27, 2012
That Kant should hold such a view should not be surprising; it is a direct consequence of his moral theory, the main outlines of which may be briefly, albeit crudely, summarized. As such, no moral agent is ever to be treated merely as a means.
Your Friday Moth to a Flame
JUNE 12, 2009
We want to take a building that has been a flashpoint for conflict on one moral issue and turn it into a place of dialogue on another one," said Bruce Friedrich, vice president for policy at People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. PETA wants to buy the clinic owned by slain Dr. Tiller. "We