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John Passmore (1914-2004) on Animal Suffering

Animal Ethics

Neither Aquinas nor Kant nor Newman denied, however, that animals could suffer: Descartes and Malebranche thought differently. To suppose that animals could feel would be to suggest that there could be pain and suffering where there has been no sin. For animals did not eat of the Forbidden Tree.

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University of Iowa Animal Lab Goes Underground

Critter News

14, 2004, break-in at animal research laboratories in the U of I’s Spence Laboratories and Seashore Hall cost about $425,000 and temporarily stalled some research. Poor, poor long-suffering animal researchers. Advertisement. I'm so sorry (actually, I'm not), but I have no patience for the sob story. They only want to help people.as

Iowa 100
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John Passmore (1914-2004) on Bentham's Treatment of Animals

Animal Ethics

" but "Can they suffer?" It is enough that they are capable of suffering. The Traités edited by Dumont condemn cruelty to animals only—if Dumont can be trusted—on the ground that it can give rise to indifference to human suffering. I do not know why Bentham changed his mind.

2004 40
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John Passmore (1914-2004) on the Moral Status of Animals

Animal Ethics

And by this they mean not only that it is wrong to enjoy torturing animals—which few moralists would ever have wished explicitly to deny, however little emphasis they might have placed on cruelty to animals in their moral teaching—but that it is wrong to cause them to suffer unnecessarily. Controversies no doubt remain.

Morals 40
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John Passmore (1914-2004) on the History of Animal Cruelty

Animal Ethics

Whereas it once used to be argued, as by Newman , that the least human good compensates for any possible amount of animal suffering, the current doctrine is that it requires a considerable good to compensate for such suffering.

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Tom Regan on Utilitarianism

Animal Ethics

Especially because animals are made to suffer in the pursuit of human purposes—in the name of "efficient" factory farming, for example, or in pursuit of scientific knowledge—the utilitarian injunction to count their suffering and to count it equitably must strike a responsive moral chord. Because animals are sentient (i.e.,

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Tom Regan on Cruelty

Animal Ethics

The central case of cruelty appears to be the case where, in Locke's apt phrase, one takes "a seeming kind of Pleasure" in causing another to suffer. Some cruel people do not feel pleasure in making others suffer. Let us term this sadistic cruelty. Indeed, they seem not to feel anything.

Cruelty 40