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John Passmore (1914-2004) on Animal Suffering

Animal Ethics

Neither Aquinas nor Kant nor Newman denied, however, that animals could suffer: Descartes and Malebranche thought differently. It is impossible, they argued, to be cruel to animals, since animals are incapable of feeling. For animals did not eat of the Forbidden Tree.

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Tom Regan on Utilitarianism

Animal Ethics

Because animals are sentient (i.e., can experience pleasure and pain) and because they not only have but can act on their preferences, any view that holds that pleasures or pains, or preference-satisfactions or frustrations matter morally is bound to seem attractive to those in search of the moral basis for the animal rights movement.

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Tom Regan on Cruelty

Animal Ethics

The central case of cruelty appears to be the case where, in Locke's apt phrase, one takes "a seeming kind of Pleasure" in causing another to suffer. Some cruel people do not feel pleasure in making others suffer. Let us term this sadistic cruelty. Indeed, they seem not to feel anything.

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Deconstructing Slate's "Pepper" Series

Animal Person

Engber mentions that in 1972, the USDA put into place "a special exemption for rats, mice, and birds, allowing scientists to treat them however they saw fit—in cages of any size, in experiments with any degree of pain and suffering. The fact that we care about--and fight for--animals based on how cute we have deemed them to be is disgraceful.