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W. D. Ross (1877-1971) on the Moral Significance of Pleasure and Pain

Animal Ethics

But when a moral being is feeling a pleasure or pain that is deserved or undeserved, or a pleasure or pain that implies a good or a bad disposition, the total fact is quite inadequately described if we say 'a sentient being is feeling pleasure, or pain'. Pleasure is good when, and only when, it is deserved.

Morals 40
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W. D. Ross (1877-1971) on Animal Rights

Animal Ethics

We had better therefore take the less complicated case of animals, which we commonly suppose not to be even potential moral agents. If we take the first view, we are implying that in order to have rights, just as much as in order to have duties, it is necessary to be a moral agent. It is not at all clear which is the true view.